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REGULATE ME ONLINE? REGULATE ME NOT?: A FORUMBASED ANALYSIS EXAMINING THE GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY
TO REGULATE CONSTITUENTS ONLINE
Sterling Gutierrez*

Over the past decade, local governments and
municipalities have begun to create policies governing their
constituents’ actions on government-managed social media
profile pages.1 Is this sort of regulation a violation of our First
Amendment rights? While authors have examined various
interconnections of social media sites and First Amendment
jurisprudence,2 this Note will explore and argue that
government-managed social media pages that incorporate
content-moderation policies should generally be labeled public
fora created by government designation; to put it another way,
these fora have been opened by the government for the sole
purpose of allowing specifically regulated communication to
occur between the government officials regulating that account
and their constituents. As social media accounts can constitute
different features or parts of the specific medium that make up
that social media platform,3 not all of these features fall within
the forum label of a designated public forum. Therefore, some
social media features will not be found to be a designated public
*

Special thanks to Rick Su, Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina
School of Law, for his comments and suggestions.
1
See Social Media Comments Policy, LOUDOUN CNTY. VA.,
https://www.loudoun.gov/2779/Social-Media-Comments-Policy (last visited Nov.
28, 2020); see also Fairfax County Social Media Policy & Guidelines for Official Accounts,
FAIRFAX CTY. VA. (May 2015),
https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/publicaffairs/sites/publicaffairs/files/assets/docum
ents/fairfax-county-social-media-policy.pdf; Public Social Media Comments Policy,
GREENSBORO N.C., https://www.greensboro-nc.gov/government/citynews/official-social-media-sites/public-social-media-comments-policy (last visited
Nov. 28, 2020); Social Media Comments Policy, BURLINGTON N.C.,
https://www.burlingtonnc.gov/1181/Social-Media-Comments-Policy (last visited
Nov. 28, 2020); Social Media Center, CHARLOTTE N.C.,
https://charlottenc.gov/newsroom/Pages/SocialMediaCenter.aspx (last visited
Nov. 28, 2020).
2
See generally Lisa A. Anderson, The First Amendment and Local Government Use of
Social Media, 99-JUL MICH. B.J. 30 (2020) (commenting on local government use of
social media policies); Kathleen McGarvey Hidy, Social Media Use and Viewpoint
Discrimination: A First Amendment Judicial Tightrope Walk with Rights and Risks Hanging
in the Balance, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1045 (2019) (analyzing the risks posed by judicial
reaction to a rights-centric approach to viewpoint discrimination claims); Nick
Reade, Is There a Right to Tweet at Your President?, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2020)
(arguing that court rulings have unconstitutionally compelled the speech of social
media companies, resulting in far-reaching ramifications).
3
For example, Facebook is a social media platform that contains different features
(or parts), such as the News Feed, the Timeline, the user’s inbox, and more that all
constitute the specific medium that make up Facebook.
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forum; instead, they may be found to be traditional public fora,
while hopefully none will be found to be nonpublic fora. With
this context, these social media features may be found to be
covered by the open meeting label, or successfully regulated by
government speech or proprietary powers. Government speech,
proprietary powers, and open meeting labels have been held by
the Supreme Court to be within the powers of the government to
regulate through content-based restrictions.4 For government
speech, no forum analysis is necessary and no First Amendment
violation will occur under this designation; however, for the
open meeting label, content-neutral restrictions need to be found
reasonable as to time, place, and manner, and content-based
restrictions must be attributable to a compelling government
interest; finally, the proprietary powers doctrine requires that
restrictions for nonpublic fora are shown to be reasonable and
without viewpoint discrimination.5
When determining the constitutionality of regulations
that create speech restrictions, the Supreme Court has pointedly
focused its First Amendment decisions mainly upon the content
of the regulated speech.6 Given how the Court targets the content
of the regulated speech, as opposed to the content-based speech
regulation, it is important to understand the broader picture by
which the Court has defined and analyzed fora. The Court has
used three major fora to encompass the spectrum of
constitutional protection for expressive activity: (1) traditional
public fora, (2) public fora created by government designation,
and (3) nonpublic fora.7
Generally, the Supreme Court has “rejected the view that
traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic
confines” of streets, sidewalks, and parks.8 The Court has never
precisely stated what those confines are as there is no working
definition for the terms “street,” “sidewalk,” or “park.”9 The
Court has also never strictly adhered to limiting the traditional

4

See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C.
See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C.
6
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(stating how “content-based” regulations can restrict speech either on the basis of its
subject matter or on the basis of its viewpoint).
7
Id. at 45–6.
8
Arkansas Educ. Television Com’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
9
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(stating how the principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of
ideas, without clarifying the boundaries).
5
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public forum category to these three historic confines.10 While
the Court has shown flexibility in its application of the public
forum analysis when comparing different public fora to streets,
sidewalks, and parks, it appears reluctant to expand the historical
confines to include the web pages of a government-managed
social media-based forum.
Beyond this, the Supreme Court has also recognized that
the government can open non-traditional spaces for use as a
public forum, labeling them as “designated public fora” and
often calling them “limited public fora.”11 The Court has held
that the government creates this public forum “only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse.”12 The Court “look[s] to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place
not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public
forum.”13 For example, in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee¸14 the Court determined that airports are
not used for the “free exchange of ideas” and, thus, would fail to
be found a public forum after analysis.15 However, in Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,16 the Court determined that the
Memorial Auditorium was a “public forum[] designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities,”17 and found the city’s refusal
to permit use of its auditorium for the “Hair” musical to be a
constitutional violation.18
For the third group, the Court has held that “[i]mplicit in
the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
identity.”19 In some cases, the Court has indicated that all
government properties not contained within the spectrum of
traditional public fora and public fora intentionally opened by
the government are nonpublic fora.20 Yet, a resounding
10

See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1981) (finding a state fair to be a public forum); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (finding the grounds of a state capitol to be a traditional public
forum).
11
Warren v. Fairfax Cnty, 196 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1999).
12
Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
13
Id.
14
505 U.S. 672 (1992).
15
Id. at 685.
16
420 U.S. 546 (1975).
17
Id. at 555.
18
Id. at 562.
19
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
20
See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680.
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characteristic that is assumed—time and again—in all Court
cases addressing nonpublic fora is that “opening the nonpublic
forum to expressive conduct will somehow interfere with the
objective use and purpose to which the property has been
dedicated.”21
When it comes to government regulation of social media
comments on the Internet, the Supreme Court has yet to address
how it would analyze and define government-based Internet
policies and practices, as this is a relatively new and open issue.
However, courts have begun to analyze whether local
governments and municipalities have violated the First
Amendment through their creation of “social media
commenting policies” by looking at whether such a forum
should be defined as: (1) government speech; (2) a proprietary
power; or (3) an open meeting of the local government or
municipality.22
In Part One, this Note looks to explore these three
avenues and their inter-relation to the three fora—traditional,
nonpublic, and government designated—the Supreme Court has
used to encompass the spectrum of constitutional protection for
expressive activity. In Part Two, this Note will look to simulate
how the Supreme Court could potentially come out on the issue
of government-based policy regulation of the Internet,
specifically targeting regulation of social media comments
occurring in many local governments and municipalities today.
Finally, in Part Three, this Note will explore future implications
of a Supreme Court decision on this issue and the trickle effect—
such as the government being able to regulate your speech on the
Internet—that could occur regarding one’s First Amendment
rights.

21

Warren v. Fairfax Cnty, 196 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1999). See, e.g., Arkansas
Educ. Television Com’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998); Krishna Consciousness,
505 U.S. at 681; Cornelius v. NCAAP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 358 U.S.
39, 47–48 (1966).
22
See, e.g., Walker v. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015)
(regarding government speech); Garlock v. Wake County Bd. Of Educ., 211 N.C.
App. 200 (2011) (regarding open meetings); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460 (regarding a local municipalities exercise of its proprietary powers).
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I. FREEDOM TO COMMENT OR FREEDOM TO BE REGULATED
A. Government Speech
When it comes to how limited public fora have been
analyzed under the First Amendment, there are two common
levels of analysis. First, the “internal standard”23 has been used
“[i]f the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class
to which a designated [limited] public forum is made generally
available.”24 In this case, the limited public forum is treated as a
traditional public forum for analysis purposes.25 Second, the
“external standard”26 restricts the “government’s ability to
designate the class for whose especial benefit the forum has been
opened.”27 All the Supreme Court has stated regarding these
limitations is that “entities of a ‘similar character’ to those
allowed access may not be excluded.”28 Thus the “selection of a
class by the government must only be viewpoint neutral and
reasonable in light of the objective purposes served by the
forum.”29
In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc,30 the Court analyzed whether Texas specialty license plate
designs were government speech, where a nonprofit
organization was requesting a specialty license plate featuring a
Confederate battle flag.31 The Court concluded that government
speech was at issue by relying on the precedent set in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum.32 Historically, Texas, among other states,
has used license plates to convey government speech such as
“slogans urging action, promoting tourism, and touting local
industries.”33 Additionally, “Texas license plate designs ‘are

23

Warren, 196 F.3d at 193.
Id. (quoting Arkansas Educ. Television Com’n, 523 U.S. at 676).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 194.
27
Id.
28
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 48
(1999)).
29
Id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
825–27 (1985). In Cornelius, Justice Blackmun opines that a limited public forum, in
this case, becomes analytically indistinct from a nonpublic forum. Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 825–27.
30
576 U.S. 200 (2015).
31
Id. at 200.
32
Id. at 201. For a discussion of the facts, holding, and reasoning of Summum, see
infra Section I.B.
33
Walker, 576 U.S. at 201.
24
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often closely identified in the public mind with the [State].’”34
The individual plates are “government article[s] serving the
governmental purposes of vehicle registration and
identification.”35 Texas owns all plate designs, requires every
Texas vehicle owner to display the plates, and issues every Texas
plate.36 Finally, “Texas maintains direct control over the
messages conveyed on its specialty plates, by giving the Board
final approval over each design.”37 Given all this, the Court
determined that Texas’ specialty plates were similar enough to
the monuments in Summum to call for the government speech
label. The Court determined that the plates were not a nonpublic
forum because the “government is . . . a proprietor, managing its
internal operations.”38 The Court reasoned that a private party’s
involvement in the plate approval had no determinative standing
over the “governmental nature of the message” nor did it
“transform the government’s role into that of a mere forumprovider.”39
What Walker made clear is that the Court has “refused
‘[t]o hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program
dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the
program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages
alternative goals.’”40 Additionally, the Court clarified that
“Texas’ specialty license plates are not a ‘traditional public
forum.’”41 The Court also stated that “Texas’ policies and the
nature of its license plates indicate that the State did not intend
its specialty license plates to serve as either a designated public
forum or a limited public forum.”42
Yet, in a fiery dissenting opinion, Justice Alito wrote that
the Court’s decision “categorizes private speech as government
speech and thus strips it of all First Amendment protection.”43
Alito argued that the majority’s reliance solely on the precedent
34

Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)); see infra
Section I.B for discussion of Summum.
35
Walker, 576 U.S. at 201.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 216 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992)).
39
Id. at 217.
40
Id. at 208 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
41
Id. at 215.
42
Id. at 216.
43
Id. at 221 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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in Summum was a complete misunderstanding of that
precedent.44 Given that the central issue in Summum was whether
the municipal government had created a forum for private speech
in the park by erecting a monument there, Alito distinguished the
characteristics which rendered public monuments government
speech in Summum from the present case involving Texas’
specialty plate program.45 He discussed how, historically,
monuments have always served to express a government
message; historically, landowners have never allowed third
parties to use their property to permanently house monuments
that do not convey the landowners’ wishes; and, spatially, parks
can only accommodate a “limited number of permanent
monuments” and thus serve a government purpose.46 Alito
found the contrast between the history of public monuments and
the Texas license plate program to be incredibly vast.47
Ultimately, Alito found that this instance was not
government speech but a government-designated public forum
whereupon private parties exercised their right of First
Amendment self-expression of speech that was being regulated
by the Texas state government; concluding, he found that the
forum analysis should have led to a discovery of unconstitutional
content-based regulation of Texas citizens’ freedom of speech.48
The contrast between the majority and dissent in Walker
is important to note as this 2015 Supreme Court opinion sets the
precedent whereupon a state or local government can
theoretically call their regulation of citizens’ private purchases—
such as a license plate, an Internet domain name, a house, and
so on—government speech, so long as: (1) these private
purchases are regulated by a government agency; and (2) these
purchases are generally viewable by some undisclosed number of
government constituents over the course of a given period of
time. This calls into question whether the government could
integrate this “catch-all” approach on Internet-based
government fora in the future and be given a favorable verdict by
the Supreme Court against any First Amendment challenges.

44

Id. at 227.
Id. at 229.
46
Id. at 228–29.
47
Id. at 230.
48
Id. at 235–36.
45
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Yet, the Supreme Court ruling in Walker came on a 5-4
split decision.49 Since then, the Supreme Court has encountered
major turnover: Justice Scalia passed away in 2016; Justice
Kennedy retired in 2018; and Justice Ginsburg passed away in
2020.50 These three justices were all replaced during Donald
Trump’s sole presidential term: Justice Gorsuch joined in 2017;
Justice Kavanaugh joined in 2018; and, most recently, Justice
Barrett joined in 2020.51 Given the 5-4 split decision, this ruling
could readily be overturned in the foreseeable future. Coming
out the other way around—where forum analysis is conducted
and finds a government-designated public forum, where
heightened scrutiny is applied—there could be a finding that
unconstitutional, content-based regulations were implemented
by the government. To surmise, the present forum doctrine
analysis, accounting for any implemented government speech
defense, could soon be decided in the opposite direction.
Therefore, the Walker decision highlights how uncertain the
application of the forum doctrine and applicable forum defenses
currently stand with the Internet—a relatively new and
unexplored First Amendment forum––in mind.
An important question to touch on is what can cause the
Supreme Court to rule a space is a nonpublic versus public
forum. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,52 a candidate running
for political office argued that his First Amendment rights were
violated by the city’s refusal to allow him to post political ads on
the city transit system.53 The Supreme Court plurality concluded
that the city transit system was not a public forum that required
it to accept payment and subsequently place Lehman’s political
advertisement.54 Shaker Heights contracted with a third party to
manage the advertising space on the city’s transit system.55
Lehman applied for and was denied space for his political
advertising, even though space was available.56 Some of the ads
accepted around that same timeframe included “cigarette
companies, banks, savings and loan associations, liquor
49

Id. at 203 (majority opinion, written by Breyer, J., and joined by Thomas, J.,
Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J.).
50
See About the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Apr. 29,
2021).
51
Id.
52
418 U.S. 298 (1974).
53
Id. at 299–301.
54
Id. at 304.
55
Id. at 299.
56
Id. at 300.
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companies” and more.57 Yet, in the twenty-six years of
operation, the City had never accepted a “political or public . . .
advertis[ments] on its vehicles.”58 The plurality opinion found
that the city’s transit system was a means of commerce for the
city as opposed to an open space or meeting hall forum.59 Thus,
the plurality concluded that “the managerial decision to limit car
card space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and
service oriented advertising” did not rise to a First Amendment
violation.60 “The city consciously has limited access to its transit
system advertising space” 61 without violating any constituents’
freedom of speech as the city was found to be a nonpublic forum
subject to a lower level of scrutiny.62 Given the reasonableness of
the content-based regulations of the ads allowed, the plurality
opinion concluded that Lehman’s First Amendment rights were
not violated without the city government explicitly raising the
government speech argument, which it would have handily
won.63
However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued
that the facts supported the creation of a public forum through
which Lehman’s First Amendment rights were violated.64 This is
because the city purposely opened the advertisement cards for
“the dissemination of information and expression of ideas when
it accepted and displayed commercial and public service
advertisements on its rapid transit vehicles.”65 Justice Brennan
highlights how the city discriminated among the forum’s users
“solely on the basis of message content.”66 While reasonable
time, place, and manner restricts are constitutional, the city—
according to Justice Brennan—attempted to justify this ban by
arguing that political advertising in the transit cars is an
inappropriate forum for expression and debate of that sort.67 The
public forum doctrine required the Court to balance the
competing interests of the government, the speaker, and the
audience; given the balancing of competing interests, Justice
Brennan found that the plurality improperly assessed the primary
57

Id.
Id. at 300–01.
59
Id. at 303.
60
Id. at 304.
61
Id.
62
See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 421–22 (1992).
63
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
64
Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 311–12.
58
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use of the city’s transit system and any disruption that could
occur from free expression of the advertising card spaces.68 “By
accepting commercial and public advertising, the city effectively
waived any argument that advertising in the transit cars is
incompatible with the rapid transit system’s primary function of
providing transportation. A forum for communication was
voluntarily established . . . .”69 Ultimately, Justice Brennan found
a designated public forum was created and Lehman’s freedom of
speech should be protected from “discrimination based solely
upon subject matter or content.”70 Justice Brennan opined that
“the [fact that the] discrimination is among entire classes of
ideas, rather than among points of view within a particular class,
does not render it any less odious.”71 Finally, Justice Brennan
rejected the nonpublic forum argument raised by the plurality
and city, as the endorsement of an opinion expressed in
advertisement on public transit is not likely to be attributed to the
local government in the same way as the opinions of a speaker
in a public park are not likely to be attributed to the city
administration.72
The plurality opinion of Lehman showed that the
Supreme Court found the city’s transit system to be a nonpublic
forum subject to lower scrutiny and didn’t require the city to raise
the government speech argument to justify its content-based
speech restrictions. As the dissenting Justice Brennan aptly
pointed out, a major purpose of the city’s transit system is the
exchange of transit ad space for money; inherently, it follows that
there should be heightened scrutiny under the forum analysis for
the city to prove that they have a compelling government interest
to regulate the ad space through content-based restrictions. There
is no reason that the City of Shaker Heights should have been
found by the plurality to be a nonpublic forum. The forum
analysis should have concluded that this is a public forum, yet
the city should have raised a government speech argument to
avoid forum analysis and justify the city’s exclusion of content
on a selective basis, as constituents would view the political ads
as the government speaking—the reality is that Shaker Heights
didn’t need to raise the government speech argument to target
exclusion of a small minority of ads, as the Court improperly
68

Id.
Id. at 314.
70
Id. at 315.
71
Id. at 316.
72
Id. at 321.
69
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labeled the transit system a nonpublic forum that justified the
city’s content-based restrictions. Ultimately, Lehman highlights
the fallibility of the Court’s forum analysis that resulted in a
minimization of the constituents’ First Amendment protections,
as nonpublic fora are subject to lower scrutiny.
These implications directly apply to an Internet-based
forum where the major purpose would be the dissemination of
information, and any local or state government could
strategically argue that they have restricted certain content-based
page ads, as opposed to others, solely because they moderate that
Internet page and do not want these ads to be misinterpreted as
views of their own. In application, this would look something
like a local government providing ad-rental space on its
government-controlled page, hoping to promote local municipal
businesses. The local government broadcasts the following
constraints for its ad space: the business must be locally owned
and operated; the business must agree to pay a monthly fee; and
the business must subscribe to any government-based
promotions developed to increase tourism. A locally owned and
operated sex toy shop, Candy, is ready to agree to all these
conditions. However, when Candy seeks to rent ad space on the
local government’s online page, the government denies them
that right, even with space available. In court, the local
government raises the government speech defense to account for
its desired content-based regulation of its government-controlled
page. The local government argues that Candy would distort the
image of the local community—one that is becoming
increasingly more conservative and is populated by a majority
Baptist community. Upon review, the court rules against the
merits of the government’s argument that the ad space is a
nonpublic forum, citing the facts as contra Lehman; as the local
government successfully argued for the ad space to be seen as
government speech, the court is precluded from conducting a
forum analysis on this First Amendment issue. The court
determined that the ad space is government speech given the
potential for the government’s online viewership to incorrectly
label this local community as a sex-positive municipality that
desires more sex-centered culture to move there. However, the
court opinion makes clear that the court would have found the
ad space to be a nonpublic forum but for the government speech
defense. While the Supreme Court decided Lehman in 1974, this
opinion sets the precedent to allow a local or state government
body to not have to worry about the Supreme Court’s stated
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adherence in Perry73 that content-based restrictions must be
supported by a compelling government interest, as the courts
have shown that certain spaces can be questionably labeled
nonpublic fora that have an easier time passing constitutional
scrutiny. Overall, the distinction between a public and nonpublic
forum seems unclear and subjective at times.
What Walker directly highlights and Lehman indirectly
highlights is that government speech arguments can be
successfully raised (but don’t always need to be) in both public
and nonpublic forum settings. Once the Supreme Court has
decided that the speech “at issue” is government speech, there is
no longer a burden on the government to prove the speech
restrictions are content neutral. Applying this to governmentcontrolled social media pages, the issue to determine would be
whether the Supreme Court would find the government exercises
enough control as to not warrant a forum analysis—as
government speech makes the forum analysis inapplicable.
Walker displayed that the Texas government could successfully
argue that government speech allowed them to regulate the
creation of license plates through a third-party manager. Lehman
showcased how the city government of Shaker Heights didn’t
need to raise a government speech argument to successfully
defend Shaker Heights’ regulation of the creation of ad-based
content on their public transit system, as the public transit system
was found to be a nonpublic forum. These Supreme Court cases
give the pretense that government regulation of their
constituents’ First Amendment rights extends beyond the
government bodies themselves; at a minimum, this extension
goes to all third-party systems that the government associates
with—whether they must have a contractual relation with them
is unclear.
Therefore, it is very likely that the Supreme Court would
hold that a government-controlled social media page—managed
by a third party such as Facebook or Twitter—could successfully
argue that government speech justifies their right to make
content-based restriction on their forum page. For example, if a
District Attorney’s (DA’s) government-controlled social media
page decided to regulate some of its constituents’ comments—
such as those questioning the DA’s actions in relation to a rise in
gang-related violence, during the DA’s term—the DA could
73

460 U.S. 37 (1983) (discussing how a content-based restriction must be shown to
serve a compelling state interest to pass scrutiny).
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claim a successful government speech defense that targets these
comments. Essentially, the argued defense would show that the
constituents’ comments are purporting to state the view of the
DA as agreeing that gang-related violence has risen in the district
during the past term—at least this is how the online viewership
has been interpreting these comments. The government speech
defense would allow the DA’s government-controlled social
media page to successfully moderate such constituents’
comments through deletion, without being subjected to a First
Amendment violation due to content-based discrimination. For,
“the Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.”74
Of important note, the government speech defense
becomes rather weak when trying to disentangle certain elements
and aspects of a particular online platform.75 Essentially, this
would create a scenario where the Supreme Court would need to
mince out each separate element of the respective online
platform to ensure that each element is given a separate and
distinct forum analysis. Then it would be up to the government
to elicit the government speech defense for each online
platform’s element, as seen fit. This is highlighted most readily
by the Court labeling the singular element-containing forum of a
license plate on a car or the ad space on the body of a bus, as
compared to the Court labeling the multifaceted, elementcontaining forum of a social media platform.
B. Proprietary Power
In Adderley v. State of Florida,76 student demonstrators
argued that their First Amendment rights were violated when
they entered government-owned jail grounds to protest prior
arrests and city segregation policies.77 The Court found that the
demonstrators were arrested solely for being on “that part of the
jail grounds reserved for jail uses [only].”78 The Court noted that
historically, there was no evidence providing that “similarly
large groups of the public [had] been permitted to gather on this
[private] portion of the jail grounds for any purpose.”79
Additionally, the Court noted that “[t]he [government], no less
74

Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
See supra text accompanying note 3.
76
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
77
Id. at 40–41.
78
Id. at 47.
79
Id. (footnote omitted).
75

358

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.”80 This emphasis of proprietary power highlighted
how the land that is under the total control of the government
may be used in any capacity that the government sees fit without
being found unconstitutional under a plaintiff’s claim of First
Amendment violations.
Yet, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas believed
history supported the jailhouse as being “an obvious center for
protest,” likening it to other seats of government such as “an
executive mansion, a legislative chamber, a courthouse, or the
statehouse itself.”81 Looking toward evidence in the record,
Justice Douglas found that the “jailhouse grounds were not
marked with ‘No TRESPASSING!’ signs, nor [did the State]
claim that the public was generally excluded from the
grounds.”82 Justice Douglas also found any attempt to analogize
the proprietary rights of the government to that of a private
owner completely off-base: “say[ing] that a private owner could
have done the same if the rally had taken place on private
property is to speak of a different case [.]”83
While the majority of Adderley made it clear that a
government’s proprietary powers will be respected and used
when a forum analysis is conducted to analyze whether the
public’s First Amendment rights have been violated, Justice
Douglas’s dissenting opinion left open the door to question
whether just because the government owns something, it can do
whatever, whenever it wants, with no need to account for our
First Amendment rights. In a hypothetical situation where a
group of constituents claim that their First Amendment rights
have been violated by not being allowed to state their objections
openly, on social media, toward a public official that maintains
a government-controlled social media account, the government
would have trouble successfully arguing that the government is
exercising its proprietary powers over that account. The
government does not per se own the Internet; it could claim
ownership to things such as domain names or URL addresses
that lend themselves to this concept of a government’s
proprietary power, but under the current jurisprudence of First
80
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Amendment law, it is a relatively weak argument to make. A
government body can clearly exercise a domain of ownership
over sections of a jail—like the government did in Adderley—to
control their constituents’ freedom of speech. However, at this
point, the same cannot be said of a government-controlled social
media page.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the government can
use proprietary powers to regulate constituents’ speech on the
government’s property.84 However, it is important to understand
the Supreme Court’s stance on whether the government can
successfully use proprietary powers to discriminate against a
third party’s ability to build structures on the government’s
property when facially similar structures have already been
erected by private parties. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,85 a
religious organization argued that their freedom of speech was
being violated when a government park—that previously erected
another donated monument—declined to erect a monument
desired by that organization.86 The Supreme Court held that the
city government was within its proprietary powers to exercise its
right to erect and deny whatever monuments it desired on its
land.87 The public park in Pleasant Grove City had “15
permanent displays, at least 11 of which were donated by private
groups or individuals[,]” including a Ten Commandments
monument.88 The City passed a resolution limiting monuments
in the park to “those that ‘either (1) directly relate to the history
of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with
longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.’”89 The City
used this resolution as the basis for rejecting Summum’s requests
for erecting a monument in the park.90 While the district court
denied the respondents claim, the Tenth Circuit reversed on the
basis that “public parks have traditionally been regarded as
public for[a],” and the City needed a compelling justification that
was narrowly tailored to accomplish its goal of differentiating
between Summum’s requested monument and the others
currently erected.91 The Supreme Court analyzed whether the
petitioners were “engaging in their own expressive conduct” or
84
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whether the petitioners were “providing a forum for private
speech.”92 The Supreme Court has generally held that
“[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property typically
[showcase the government’s use of proprietary powers]”93
because the government can decide what will or will not be
displayed to communicate a message on government property,
without a constitutional violation. Analogizing how
governments use monuments to communicate messages to the
way “kings, emperors, and other rulers” have used monuments
to communicate messages to their subjects, the Supreme Court
strengthened its analysis by noting that monuments are erected
with a designated purpose.94 Ultimately, property owners do not
usually permit construction of monuments without rationally
interpreting what message they will convey on the property
owner’s behalf. As the Court observed, “[t]his is true whether the
monument is located on private property or on public
property[.]”95
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Summum makes clear
that the government has the right to control and regulate what
can and cannot be placed on its property when such regulation
is aimed at monitoring how the government’s constituents will
perceive the message. This applies to land that has traditionally
been regarded as public fora, such as state and local parks.
Therefore, the Court held that the resolution of Pleasant Grove
City was proper in that it aimed to condition an organization’s
request of erecting monuments on whether it would tend to
support the viewpoints that the local government desired to
espouse.
Both Adderley and Summum display that the Supreme
Court allows the government to execute its proprietary powers
in relation to both public and private government property,
specifically regarding the affixation of any object on that
property for a fixed or fluctuating time that will be perceived as
the government’s own speech. To put it simply, if the
government owns it, then the government can decide what can
and will be put on its land. The government’s execution of its
proprietary powers is exempt from heightened scrutiny that
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would be normally triggered by a government’s regulation of its
constituents’ speech.96
In the case where the forum at issue is a governmentcontrolled social media page, the government would have to
exercises clear ownership over the social media site—this is a
necessary condition as social media sites contain a variety of
elements that each require an individual forum analysis to be
conducted. 97 For example, the government would need to own
and operate a government-specific social media site.
Furthermore, a constituent would need to request to display a
custom webpage design layout—such as one that has Bible
verses wrapped throughout the background—that would appear
on some, if not all, of that government-specific social media site’s
pages. Then the government would need to argue that under its
proprietary powers—of that public or privately-regulated forum
site—such a webpage design layout would either espouse a
viewpoint the government does or does not desire to have its
constituents contribute to it.
As a hypothetical, imagine a state government has
created a state owned-and-operated government site. The
purpose of this site is to allow candidates running for election to
have a controlled forum where each candidate can advocate for
themselves and for any position on the ballot up to election day.
Constituents are given limited access to the site: the constituents
can only view potential candidates on the ballot, ask them
questions through commenting on candidates’ campaign
webpages, and show support to candidates through “likes” or
anecdotal plugs. The state supports this owned-and-operated
government site by having different private parties—throughout
the state—purchase and fund candidate webpages. The private
party donation is recognized on the bottom of each funded
candidate page, with a short-word attribution proposed by the
donor and approved by the government. Thus, a candidate’s
campaign page could say, “This webpage is supported by Farmer
Joe of Corn Farms, Incorporated.” A handful of alt-right
supporters submitted their short-word attribution that stated the
following: “This webpage is supported by the Ku Klux Klan of
Wake-Up Media, Incorporated.” The government denies this
proposal and rejects all subsequent proposals by the group. The
alt-right supporters bring suit, and the government defends its
96
97

See id. at 473.
See discussion infra Section II.
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actions by claiming proprietary power over the site. The court
rules in favor of the government, stating that the campaign forum
is owned-and-operated by the government; therefore, the
government can moderate what is and is not purchased and
placed on the site, since it could reasonably be construed that the
government or that specific campaign page supports the alt-right
movement.
Given the previous example and hypothetical, a
fundamental issue arises when applying Summum and Adderley
to a government-controlled social media site. Control is the key,
determinative factor. The government simply does not control or
own a social media forum, and there does not appear to exist a
good basis for making such an argument. It would be one thing—
like in the hypothetical—if the government bought and
controlled all aspects of an Internet-based forum, but when the
government is using a third-party social media site, this is not the
case. In today’s day and age, the most necessary component of a
government exercising its proprietary powers (control) falls short
of existence. The government’s rights-of-ownership over the
social media page are tangibly different from the government’s
rights-of-ownership over the social media platform. As such, any
argument by the government that it can regulate constituents’
comments on its social media page through its exercising of its
proprietary powers should be rejected by the Supreme Court.
Ultimately, this will be an argument that is best examined in a
case-by-case basis, that—depending on the facts—could come
out either way.
C. Open Meetings
What is an open meeting? In Garlock v. Wake County Board
of Education,98 the North Carolina Court of Appeals, targeting inperson meetings, reasoned that “saying that a meeting is ‘open’
tells us very little.”99 With this in mind, the N.C. Court of
Appeals “generally consider[s] many factors” when analyzing
whether “a meeting is truly open to the public.”100 Factors can
include “notice for meetings, distribution of agendas,
98

211 N.C. App. 200 (2011) (discussing how Wake County Board of Education held
an open meeting where the Board’s last-minute adoption of a ticketing policy
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preparation and availability of minutes of meetings, location and
characteristics of the meeting place, recordation of minutes,” and
more.101 Thus, the N.C. Court of Appeals gives a baseline for
how to analyze in-person meetings. These factors are useful as
they provide a baseline through which one can begin to analyze
whether an open meetings law violation can occur if such a
meeting does not occur when a government “body” meets
physically or digitally—such as an open meeting occurring on a
24/7 basis through a government-controlled social media
account that is solely directed at answering questions as they
arise.
As stated in Garlock, when a meeting is “held in secret and
without prior notice, or [when] no member of the public is
permitted to attend and no media access is permitted,”102 this is
great evidence supporting the fact that an open meetings law
violation occurred. While such open meetings laws are generally
directed at and meant to govern authorized meetings of
government “bodies,” open meetings have never been expressly
defined or made exclusionary.103 So, a 24/7 government body
open meeting occurring online could theoretically be possible.
During a government body review, courts analyze open meeting
violations de novo as they are a question of law.104 “[E]ach official
meeting of a public body shall be open to the public, and any
person is entitled to attend such a meeting.”105 Garlock gives an
important understanding on how courts have analyzed
violations of open meetings laws that have generally been
directed at in-person meetings, whether broadcast online or held
in a city hall. These laws have been put in place to ensure that
the government bodies can “meet as groups to deliberate or take
action on public [matters]” that are then open and accessible to
the public.106 Applying Garlock to a government-controlled social
media page is most sensible when that page is streaming a live
Q&A session, but it is not entirely clear how it would apply when
such a forum labels itself as open 24/7 to address and answer
concerns. Furthermore, it is unclear how the agenda of such a
meeting would be updated, or if it would transpire under a broad
agenda that can address and answer anything that such a
101
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government-controlling entity regularly does in the course of
their business.
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’
Association,107 while discussing public fora, the Supreme Court
stated that a government is entitled to make “[r]easonable time,
place and manner regulations” and content-based speech
regulations must be “narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest.”108 Governments may reserve nonpublic fora for
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
speech regulation is reasonable and not “an effort to suppress
expression.”109 Applying this doctrine to the hypothetical, 24/7
government-controlled social media open meeting, the Supreme
Court could readily find constitutional any content-based speech
restrictions, so long as the restrictions were narrowly tailored to
accomplish that particular government body’s day-to-day
expressive activity—such as moderating the day’s open meeting
agenda to focus solely on building permits, while excluding all
other issues.
On the other hand, an example of impermissible contentbased speech restrictions would be highlighted by a District
Attorney’s (DA’s) social media page given the following
constraints: the page is used primarily to discuss the DA’s
campaign for re-election; the page is moderated by one of the
DA’s information technology (IT) employees; some of the DA’s
constituents have begun to comment on the social media page,
questioning how the DA will crack down on the increased gang
violence in the area, given his previous track record; finally, the
IT moderator has begun to delete these comments as they are
detracting from the DA’s re-election traction. Given that the
Perry doctrine highlights that content-based restrictions must be
narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government
interest, the IT moderator’s actions would be unconstitutional
toward the commenting constituents’ First Amendment rights.
That is because these content-based speech exclusions are clear
examples of viewpoint discrimination, solely deleted by the IT
moderator because of the bad publicity they are causing the DA’s
re-election campaign.
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The next question to address is whether an online
government social media profile could ever be viewed as a public
or nonpublic forum. In United States Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Associations,110 the Court’s majority and
dissenting opinions answered the question as to whether a
letterbox was a public forum.111 The Court debated whether a
letter box should be regarded as a public forum because letters
are a traditional means for public communication, or as a
nonpublic forum because the government specifically reserved
the use of letterboxes for the delivery of letters.112 The issue at
hand was whether the U.S. Postal Service was violating the First
Amendment right of the Council of Greenburgh Civic
Associations when the Postal Service communicated that it
would fine the continued practice of the Council’s placement of
unstamped notices in the letterboxes of private homes.113
The Majority found that if a letterbox is designated as an
“authorized depository” of the Postal Service, then “it becomes
an essential part of the nationwide system for delivery and receipt
of mail.”114 Such a designation does not then transform the
letterbox into a “public forum” through which the First
Amendment guarantees access to all.115 Additionally, there is
neither historical nor constitutional support for “characterization
of a letterbox as a public forum.”116 The Court has recognized
that the constitution “does not guarantee access to property” due
to government ownership or control.117 The Majority keenly
noted that the Council never claimed that the Postal Service was
treating their unstamped notices differently because of their
“content”—a triggering word for most First Amendment claims
where the Court would subject the government to heightened
scrutiny.118 Therefore, the Majority concluded that the letterbox
is a nonpublic forum.119
110
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However, in Justice Marshall’s dissent he stated that “the
concept of a public forum” properly opens “varied governmental
locations to equal public access for free expression subject to”
proper “time, place, or manner” constraints as necessary.120
Comparing the Court’s definition of public fora to the traditional
function of the mailing system—being so inherently a part of
society—Marshall embraces Holmes’ words121 by stating that it
“is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
tongues.”122 This led to Marshall’s conclusion that the Postal
Service is a public forum, given its “pervasive and traditional use
as purveyor of written communication.”123 Taking his analysis
even further, Justice Marshall entertained the argument that the
government has full control of the mailing system; then he
reasoned that the Council’s purpose in using the government
property is well in line with the purpose it is designated for:
reception of written communication.124 Ultimately, Justice
Marshall rejected the Majority’s finding that the government
owns the mailing system, as letterboxes are privately owned.125
“Under the Court’s reasoning, the Postal Service could decline
to deliver mail unless the recipients agreed to open their doors to
the letter carrier—and then the doorway, or even the room inside
could fall within Postal Service control.”126
Greenburgh Civic Associations serves as a good illustration
for how the forum of the Internet could be examined. The
Internet is a relatively new medium through which
communication has been revolutionized by allowing “various
computer networks around the world to interconnect.”127
Because of this globalization of communication, anyone with
access to a computer can access anyone on the Internet at any
time. This includes instant messages, communications on social
media, and the like. Given the recency of the Internet, there is
limited historical precedent where the Supreme Court has
discussed access to and the role of the Internet generally.128 Yet,
120
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there has been no Supreme Court precedent regarding
government-managed social media pages, upon which to rely on.
Simply put, the Court in Greenburgh Civic Associations would find
it hard to argue that the government owns the Internet. Given
that the Internet is a global medium of communication, the
closest argument to be made would be that the Internet exists
through the establishment of privately-owned computers
connected to a government-owned infrastructure. With this in
mind, the Court would concede that the functional purpose and
designation of this infrastructure is to allow communication
between constituents. If Farmer Joe wants to chat with Friar
Tuck about how many bushels of corn Friar Tuck wants
delivered this week, Farmer Joe can do this without having to go
through the hassle of calling or rendezvousing to meet in person.
Therefore, the Internet, although not a traditional public
forum,129 fits favorably into the public forum category. Both the
majority and dissenting opinions of Greenburgh Civic Associations
(discussed above) would agree on this conclusion.
The next question to explore is to what extent could a
government-moderated social media forum exercise control over
its constituents’ actions. In Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Board,130 the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether a rental property
owner had his First Amendment right to free speech violated
when he was ejected from a public rent control board meeting.131
The court reasoned that “[c]itizens are not entitled to exercise
their First Amendment rights whenever and wherever they
wish.”132 Kindt argued, inter alia, that because the rent control
board meeting restricted his comments to three minutes per item
at a given meeting, his First Amendment rights were being
violated.133 However, the Supreme Court has held that
“[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations are
permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly
drawn to effectuate a compelling [government] interest.”134
public forum); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (equating the Internet to traditional fora like public streets and parks);
Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (noting that the Internet
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But see, Packingham, 137 S.Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring) (comparing the
Internet to traditional public fora).
130
67 F.3d 266 (9th Cir. 1995).
131
Id. at 267.
132
Id. at 269.
133
Id. at 271.
134
Id. at 270 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983)).

368

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

Given this, the Ninth Circuit found that “[n]o invidious
regulation of Kindt’s speech was implicated and [speech] content
was not a factor” in limiting Kindt’s public comments.135 The
Ninth Circuit further rationalized that “the . . . structured nature
of city council and city board meetings ma[de] them fit . . . neatly
into the nonpublic forum niche,” yet the Ninth Circuit held the
determinative factor to be the city’s limitations on speech being
reasonable and content-neutral.136
With the Ninth Circuit decision in Kindt, and the
Supreme Court decision in Greenburgh Civic Associations, an
online government social media profile could be viewed as an
open forum. If viewed as a public forum, a governmentcontrolled social media account could most certainly operate as
an ongoing, 24/7 open meeting. If viewed as a nonpublic forum,
a government-controlled social media account could be
interpreted to be a privately owned domain on a public-based
network that falls into the open meeting label, but it would be
easier for the government to argue that its limitations on speech
are reasonable and content neutral or simply fall under the
government speech defense.
As seen in Kindt, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the city
board meeting was a nonpublic forum.137 As seen in Greensburgh,
the Supreme Court Majority found letterboxes to be a
government-owned, nonpublic forum,138 while the dissenting
Justice Marshall rejected this view and found the letterboxes to
be a public forum with individual, private ownership.139 With
these cases in mind, how would a court come out on a forum
analysis of a government-controlled social media profile when
analyzing whether the government’s regulation of speech is
proper? If the forum analysis found the government-controlled
social media profile to be a public forum, the court would
evaluate the forum under Perry by looking to see whether the
regulations are reasonable as to time, place, and manner, and
whether content-based regulations serve a compelling
government interest to ensure those regulations are permissible.
However, if the forum analysis concludes the social media
profile is a nonpublic forum, then the government will be
135
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analyzed under lower scrutiny. The government-based policy
restrictions will only need to be found to be reasonable and not a
form of viewpoint discrimination. If functioning as an open
meeting, the social media profile would need to comply with all
the relevant open meetings laws that apply to government
bodies, while still ensuring no First Amendment violations occur
under the nonpublic forum court designation.
Finally, it is important to note that even if the Court did
not find a First Amendment violation based on the governmentbased policy restrictions in place, it is possible that there could
still be an open meetings law violation. These violations are not
determined through forum analysis; instead, they are determined
by the specific state’s laws.
II. WHAT WOULD THE SUPREME COURT DO?
In Davison v. Plowman,140 the plaintiff commented on the
official Commonwealth Attorney’s Facebook page, and the
defendant both deleted that comment and proceeded to block the
plaintiff from leaving further comments.141 Loudoun County
maintains a “Social Media Comments Policy” that reserves the
County’s rights to “‘delete submissions’ that violated
enumerated rules” such as vulgar language or spam.142 Before
the plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment, Defendant
“voluntarily restored [the] [p]laintiff’s access to his office’s
Facebook page[,] at least partially restored [the] [p]laintiff’s
original comment,” and revised the “‘Social Media Comments
Policy’ adopted by Loudoun County . . . .”143 These revisions
include the following: (1) requiring the Office of the County
Administrator to “review and authorize the removal of a
comment when appropriate,” (2) adding a “review process
through which commenters [may] contest the removal of their
comments,” and (3) revoking the “County’s right to delete
comments that are ‘clearly off topic.’”144 The court analyzed
whether the Commonwealth Attorney’s Facebook page should
140
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be designated as a limited public forum.145 Because the County’s
policy invited and delineated the type of speech the social media
page intended to facilitate, the court found that the “policy
indicate[d] the County’s intent to open a forum for speech that
the public may utilize consistent with certain restrictions.”146
Thus a “metaphysical” forum was created by the policy for First
Amendment purposes.147 The Court then analyzed whether a
First Amendment violation occurred.148 Due to the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s failure to “address
whether his comment complied with the County’s Social Media
Comments Policy” left the issue open for debate.149 Without
further information to rely on, the district court denied the
plaintiff’s requested motion.150
Plowman displays that a county’s social media policy can
create a designated public forum when the government clearly
articulates what can and cannot be communicated on its
government-managed social media accounts, when such
accounts are intended to allow communication between the
government and its constituents, and when such accounts allow
access and accessibility to the public at large. Although the court
found that the plaintiff could not win his First Amendment suit
on summary judgment, it is clear that the district court took this
matter seriously and went so far as to decide whether forum
analysis needed to be conducted to properly conclude whether a
municipality’s policy regulations violated a constituent’s First
Amendment right.
In Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump,151 an
organization sued the President of the United States claiming
that the President had violated their First Amendment rights on
Twitter.152 The district court considered whether “a public
official [could], consistent with the First Amendment, ‘block’ a
145

Id. at *3.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at *4.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019), vacating
as moot, Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute, No. 20-197, 2021 WL 1240931,
at *1 (S.Ct. Apr. 4, 2021) (mem). I am analyzing the district court opinion as it gives
a more in-depth analysis than the Second Circuit provides. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has ordered the lower court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the
case as moot, as Trump is no longer in office. and Twitter has banned his account.
152
Id.
146

2021] REGULATE ME ONLINE? REGULATE ME NOT? 371
person from his Twitter account” when that person voiced
differing political views and concluded that the answer is “no.”153
The major issue of this dispute concerned “whether a public
official’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs on Twitter
implicat[ed] a forum.”154
The district court considered the applicability of the
forum doctrine.155 As a threshold issue for using forum analysis,
the district court rejected “any contention that the
@realDonaldTrump account as a whole is the would-be forum
to be analyzed.”156 As the Plaintiffs solely sought narrow access
to Twitter, the forum analysis focused on: “the content of the
tweets sent, the timeline comprised of those tweets, the comment
threads initiated by each of those tweets, and the ‘interactive
space’ associated with each tweet in which other users may
directly interact with the content of the tweets.”157
The district court then analyzed whether the putative
forum is owned or controlled by the government.158 Although
Twitter is a private company that is not government-owned, the
court found this to not be dispositive.159 Because the President
and Scavino160 exercised control over the @realDonald Trump
account in relation to the content of the tweets, the timeline
compiling those tweets, and the interactive space associated with
each tweet, the court found that these aspects of control over the
@realDonald Trump account were “sufficient to establish the
government-control element.”161 The court highlighted that this
control did not extend to “the content of a retweet or reply,”
153
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showing that the court clearly delineated exactly all that the
government-controlled forum encompassed.162 While the
defendants argued that the President established the account in
2009—before the presidential inauguration—the district court
found this to be an unpersuasive justification for why no
governmental control had been exercised.163 The court used an
analogy to convey its reasoning on the defendant’s contention: a
facility that is initially developed “by the government as a
military base” is plainly not a public forum, but if that military
base “is subsequently decommissioned and repurposed into a
public park,” then the present use of the military base as a public
park would bear more heavily on the forum analysis, as opposed
to its “historical origins as a military installation.”164 Thus, “the
President and Scavino’s present use of the @realDonaldTrump
account weigh[ed] far more heavily in the [forum] analysis than
the origin of the account.”165
Next the district court assessed “whether application of
forum analysis is consistent with the purpose, structure, and
intended use of the @realDonaldTrump account that” the court
found “to satisfy the government control-or-ownership
criterion.”166 Forum analysis is not appropriate when “the
government has broad discretion to make content-based
judgments in deciding what private speech” may be made
available to the public, such as a government-based
broadcaster.167 The Supreme Court had reasoned that public
forum claims would “obstruct the legitimate purposes of
television broadcasters.”168 As government speech falls outside
the forum analysis, the district court examined three factors that
the Supreme Court has previously used to assess government
speech as opposed to private speech: (1) “whether government
has historically used the speech in question ‘to convey state
messages,’ [(2)] whether that speech is ‘often closely identified in
the public mind’ with the government, and [(3)] the extent to
which [the] government ‘maintain[s] direct control over the
messages conveyed.’”169 The District Court used these factors to
162
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reason that the “content of the President’s tweets [were not]
susceptible to forum analysis,” as the content of the tweets could
be used “to announce, describe, and defend [the President’s]
policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to
announce official decisions;” and more.170 Through this same
reasoning, “the account’s timeline, which ‘displays all tweets
generated by the [account]’ [was] not susceptible to forum
analysis.”171 However, the district court concluded that the
“interactive space for replies and retweets created [through
interaction with] the @realDonaldTrump account” was subject
to forum analysis.172 The court found that “the association that a
reply has with a governmental sender of the tweet being replied
to” cannot, by itself, be sufficient to “render the reply
government speech.”173 The court applied this same logic to the
interactive space to conclude that this space is subject to forum
analysis and is not government speech.174
Next, the district court analyzed how to classify the
interactive space.175 The court readily concluded that “the
interactive space of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is not a
traditional public forum.”176 The court stated that there is no
historical practice of using the interactive space of
@realDonaldTrump on the medium of Twitter for public
speech.177 The court then found that the “factors strongly support
the conclusion that the interactive space is a designated public
forum.”178 These factors included how the @realDonaldTrump
account was accessible to the public at large, that the President
communicated directly with the other Twitter users, and that
Twitter is designed for and maintained as a platform whereby
users interact with each other.179
With this in mind, the district court considered “whether
the blocking of the individual plaintiffs [was] permissible in a
designated public forum,” focusing analysis on the interactive
space, as the tweets and timeline were found to be government
speech that did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment
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rights.180 Designated public fora must have restrictions
“‘narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.’”181
Regardless, viewpoint discrimination is impermissible when
directed at speech normally allowed within the forum’s
limitations.182 The district court found that the individual
plaintiffs “were indisputably blocked as a result of viewpoint
discrimination,” and the record established that the plaintiffs
criticized the President and his policies and were subsequently
blocked.183 Viewpoint discrimination occurred because blocking
a user “limit[s] [their] right to speak in a discrete, measurable
way[,]”184 which in this case resulted in the plaintiffs’ inability to
voice their particular opinions and beliefs.
The question to analyze becomes whether the Supreme
Court would agree with the district court’s opinion in Knight First
Amendment Institute. It seems plausible that the Supreme Court
would find that a government-managed social media page has
multiple elements that need to be examined. Some of those
elements would not require the Court to conduct a complete
forum analysis, as these elements would fall under the
government speech label—in some fact-specific cases, these
elements could fall under the open meeting label or even the
proprietary power label. Other elements would be found to fit
into a designated public forum after completion of the Court’s
forum analysis.
As a hypothetical, consider a District Attorney (DA)
running for re-election. That DA has a government-controlled
social media account on Facebook. The DA’s social media page
is mainly used to advertise his candidacy, while updating
constituents on the DA’s accomplishments over his term in
public office. The DA posts frequently on his Facebook page,
and one of his constituents comments on a recent post. The DA’s
post states how the DA is “hard on crime” and has a “track
record to prove it.” The constituent comments a rebuttal and
states how there are several tangible examples that display why
the DA is not “hard on crime” and does not deserve to be elected
again because, among other things, he is “bought off by those
180
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that can afford it.” Additionally, the constituent shares the post
and writes a caption for the shared post where the constituent
states: “The current DA has not only been soft on crime but has
proven that he is incapable of leading our district from crime and
corruption. Stand with me in voting for Candidate Blair.” In
response to this, the DA’s government-controlled Facebook
account proceeds to block the constituent on Facebook and
delete the constituent’s post-specific comments; this causes the
post the constituent shared on his account to be deleted, as his
access to the original post is revoked. The DA’s governmentcontrolled Facebook account justifies its actions under their
state’s specific regulation policies that are all addressed in the
“Public Officials with Government-controlled Social Media
Accounts” policy handbook. In response to the DA’s actions, the
constituent brings suit against the DA, claiming a First
Amendment rights violation.
To evaluate this First Amendment suit, the Supreme
Court would need to start off by analyzing whether the plaintiff’s
speech is protected by the First Amendment. Given that the
speech simply commented on the DA’s candidacy, the plaintiff’s
speech would fall under speech that is protected. Then the
Supreme Court would need to determine the extent of the forum
to be analyzed. Given that Facebook is a privately-owned
company, and the government-controlled account is simply one
portion of that medium, it is logical to believe that the Supreme
Court would limit its forum analysis to much less than the entire
social media medium. In fact, the Court should find the targetforum to encompass the DA’s Facebook page, the DA’s posts,
the DA’s private messages, and the interactive space medium
between these posts and the other Facebook users, as these are
the relevant sites of inquiry for this First Amendment claim.185
Next the Supreme Court would need to analyze the
extent to which the government exercises control over the forum
in question. Although Facebook is privately owned, the DA, and
any other government employees assisting in its moderation,
exercise control sufficient to establish this element. This
conclusion is justified because the Facebook page is used
primarily for the DA’s re-election campaign. It displays to the
185
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district’s constituents anything and everything that the DA
desires to have highlighted on the campaign-centered account. It
also allows the DA the opportunity to answer any relevant
questions that constituents may have regarding the DA’s track
record. While the DA may have created the Facebook page prior
to his election as the DA, the current use’s major focus is related
to that of a public official in office, as opposed to a private citizen;
after all, the current use bears most heavily on the Court’s forum
analysis.
Following this, the Supreme Court would next analyze
whether the application of the forum analysis is consistent with
the purpose, structure, and intended use of the DA’s Facebook
page, posts, private messages, and interactive space medium.
This is where the Court should find that the governmentcontrolled Facebook account exercises the government speech
defense—or in some fact-specific cases, the open meeting or
proprietary power label—over both the page and posts made on
that account’s timeline. This is because the government is
allowed to regulate what is said when it speaks on its own behalf.
However, if the Court instead finds the account’s timeline to be
a government-designated public forum, the restrictions at play
would need to be reasonable as to time, place, and manner, and
any content-based restrictions would need to serve a compelling
government interest. With this in mind, it appears that the
Supreme Court would find that the DA’s government-controlled
Facebook account timeline is reasonable as to time, place, and
manner restrictions—given the statewide regulation policy
currently in place. The statewide policy operates within the
permissible designated public forum constraints by establishing
restrictions that limit other social media users from speaking
about topics outside the scope the DA set regarding content the
account’s page and posts target, while clearly disallowing slurs,
hate speech, and related communications, which can be seen as
a compelling government interest. Ultimately, the Court should
conclude that the account’s timeline and the content from each
of the timeline’s posts should be found unsusceptible to forum
analysis as the timeline is regulated under the government speech
defense.
However, the Supreme Court should find that the
interactive space medium and private messages are outside the
scope of what government speech can regulate under the First
Amendment. The interactive space medium is open to the

2021] REGULATE ME ONLINE? REGULATE ME NOT? 377
public, and other account users can share posts to their own
Facebook account timeline and comment their own thoughts
related to these posts. Indeed, the essential function of the
interactive space medium is to allow private speakers to engage
with the content of the user-specific posts, lending itself to
supporting the application of forum analysis. By focusing on the
access sought by the speaker, the Supreme Court should find the
interactive space medium to not be government speech. Through
the same logic, private messages are created through userspecific actions to establish an open dialogue between two
people. The essential function of the inbox is to allow two users
to communicate, lending itself to supporting the application of
forum analysis. Focusing on the forum space of the inbox, the
Supreme Court should find that private messages are not
regulated by government speech.
The next step for the Supreme Court would be to classify
the interactive space medium and inbox fora. Given the
historical precedent of traditional public fora, along with the lack
of historical precedent of the Facebook medium, the Court
should find that the interactive space is not a traditional public
forum. However, the inbox space could very likely be paralleled
to that of the streets or public park—free from content-based
regulation and open to those who choose to respond to messages
there. Therefore, the inbox space should be designated a public
forum. Moving on to government-designated fora, it appears that
the DA, by creating this government-controlled Facebook
account, intended to permit a limited-topic discourse on the
interactive space medium. Given that Facebook users can
interact at will and the purpose of the government-controlled
account is so the DA can communicate directly to the
constituents, these factors lend themselves to the belief that the
interactive space medium should be found to be a designated
government forum. Considering whether the interactive space
medium should be labeled a nonpublic forum under proprietary
powers, it is clear that the Supreme Court should answer this
with a resounding “no.” This is because the government neither
owns Facebook nor the Internet. There is a very weak argument
to be made by the DA that the government exercises ownership
over this medium. While the government satisfies the control
element necessary to utilize proprietary powers, the issue
becomes ownership of a third-party platform. This ownership
does not exist; furthermore, the government will have a hard
time arguing that a social media platform should be designated a
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nonpublic forum. Hence, the Court should conclude that the
interactive space medium is a designated public forum.
Finally, the Supreme Court will examine whether the
actions—blocking the constituent and deleting his comments,
resulting in the deletion of his shared post—of the DA’s
government-controlled Facebook account resulted in viewpoint
discrimination, in a violation of the constituent’s First
Amendment rights. This will ultimately be a fact-specific
judgment. In this case, it does not appear that the constituent’s
comments violated the statewide regulation policy in place.
Thus, the Court should find that viewpoint discrimination
occurred, as the constituent’s comments seem well within the
permissible speech otherwise designated by the forum’s
limitations—set by the DA’s office. Thus, blocking the
constituent, as a result of comments expressed in opposition to
the DA’s public office candidacy, should be found impermissible
under the First Amendment.
While this will always be a fact-specific analysis, it
appears that the Supreme Court would come out extremely close
to how the district court did in Knight First Amendment Institute.
This is the correct analysis, and, if Plowman was analyzed beyond
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, it should be
decided the same way.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The implications of the Supreme Court coming out, as
analyzed above, on government-controlled social media
accounts would be beneficial for the continued freedom and
exercise of one’s individual First Amendment rights. A bad
scenario would occur if the Court found that all elements of any
government-controlled social media account, on a third-party
platform, are government speech. This would throw out any
potential forum analysis, as this would be a complete defense
against any First Amendment challenges. In turn, the
government would have justified the deletion of constituents’
comments and the blocking of any who spoke against the
government’s beliefs—showcasing an extremely broad-reaching
application of the government speech defense capable of
longterm detrimental effects. Thus, the government would more
readily be able to regulate our freedom of speech in a wider
capacity of fora than previously allotted. Yet, the worst-case
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scenario for our freedom of speech would occur if the Court
found that any of the elements of a government-controlled social
media accounts were thoroughly under government control to
allow the government to execute its proprietary powers. This
would allow the government to avoid heightened scrutiny and
essentially regulate every constituent’s interaction on the
government-controlled social media page, and who knows how
far-reaching such a ruling could extend online. However, if the
Supreme Court conducts a similar analysis to Knight First
Amendment Institute, then there will be no concerns over greater
government regulation on Internet-based fora and beyond.
Yet, a pressing concern is the fact that the Supreme Court
has experienced major turnover since the 5-4 split decision in
Walker. This has opened the door for the Supreme Court to
completely disagree with the forum analysis conducted in Knight
First Amendment Institute. This could lead the Supreme Court to
decide that the government can regulate all private affairs—even
those on third-party social media sites—by utilizing government
speech and proprietary powers as a dual-pronged governmentdefense-framework through which the government avoids
heightened scrutiny. This result would lead to one’s First
Amendment rights quickly dissipating online.
Additionally, the municipal-based regulation policies that
are being created to regulate constituents’ speech on
government-controlled social media accounts seem to do no
more than ensure that public officials are keeping in line with the
established case law that has been put forth from the court
system. Thus, it should not be as concerning that these policies
are being created, as they appear to do no more than to formally
lay down the boundaries—concerning the First Amendment—
that government-controlled social media accounts can regulate
within.
All things considered, this Note attempts to convey why
government-managed social media pages that incorporate
policies—aimed at moderating their pages—are generally public
fora created by government designation. Specifically, these fora
have been opened by the government for the sole purpose of
allowing specific communication to occur between them and
their constituents. Any such features of the social media forum
not found to be labeled a designated public forum will tend not
to be labeled a traditional public fora. Resultingly, these features
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will ignore heightened scrutiny and would be found to be
government speech, or be successfully regulated as a nonpublic
forum under the government’s proprietary power, which have
been held by the Supreme Court to be within the powers of the
government to regulate through content-based restrictions,
without violating one’s First Amendment rights.
There should be concern for the amount of new
government regulations the future holds in store. Ultimately,
what happens next is for the Supreme Court to decide.
Hopefully, the Court decides well, as the impact will be greatly
felt by all as we advance into an era dominated by increased
Internet usage and regulation.

